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PERSONS AND THE POINT OF THE LAW 
RICHARD W. GARNETT † 
I. 
I interviewed for a law-teaching position at Notre Dame Law 
School in the Fall of 1997.  So far as I know, that visit to Our 
Lady’s university and to lovely, cosmopolitan South Bend, Indiana, 
was my first.  I had never attended a Catholic school at any level 
and was not much of a Fighting Irish fan.  The circumstances 
and conversations that resulted in my being on campus for that 
interview were both unpredicted and unpredictable, although I 
know now they were providential. 
In any event, what struck me most forcefully over that 
weekend—besides the freezing rain that persisted throughout 
the football game I attended1—was my now-colleagues’ palpable 
enthusiasm for and excitement about what they were building.  
That is, the “Catholic law school project”—at that time, at Notre 
Dame—did not feel like and was not presented as an exercise in 
nostalgia, retrieval, or reaction.  Instead, there seemed to be a 
widely shared sense that this “project” was something that had 
not really been tried before and that the goal was not to regain  
 
 
 
† Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Law, Concurrent Professor 
of Political Science, and Faculty Director of the Program on Church, State & Society 
at the University of Notre Dame. This paper is based on a talk delivered at a 
February 14, 2020, conference sponsored by the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 
and the Center for Law and Religion at St. John’s University School of Law. I am 
grateful to Professors Marc DeGirolami and Mark Movsesian for their leadership of 
the Center, to my fellow participants in the conference, to my colleagues Patricia 
O'Hara, Nicole Garnett, and Christian Burset for their comments and suggestions, 
and to Anthony Nania, J.D., and his journal colleagues for their hard work and 
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1 Notwithstanding the bad weather, it was a great game. Notre Dame’s Allen 
Rossum saved the 21–17 win by knocking Navy’s Pat McGrew, who had somehow 
caught a long Hail Mary heave, out of bounds at the two-yard line as time expired. 
See Al Lesar, Notre Dame 21, Navy 17, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Nov. 1, 1997), 
https://und.com/sports-m-footbl-archive-97season-nd-m-footbl-game09sum-html/ 
[https://perma.cc/KU7R-HNZP]. 
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something that had been lost but rather to work on something 
new, namely, an engaged and excellent law school that was 
meaningfully, distinctively, and therefore interestingly Catholic.2 
I am grateful to Professors John Breen and Lee Strang for, 
among other things, confirming that I and my colleagues were—
and, I hope, still are—right. 
II. 
Professors John Breen and Lee Strang have performed a 
valuable service with their careful and engaging study of 
Catholic legal education in the United States, A Light Unseen: A 
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States.3  Their 
central and animating proposal is that “[a]ny plausible rationale 
for a Catholic law school must justify the focal case of the school, 
which is an academic institution and intellectual enterprise. . . .  
[A] Catholic law school must also possess an ‘intellectual 
architecture’ that sets it apart.”4  I enthusiastically embrace this 
proposal and will consider some features of one such possible 
“architecture” below.  But first, I will briefly underscore three 
points that are made or supported in A Light Unseen and that 
seem essential to understanding, and carrying on, the “Catholic 
law school project.” 
First, and as was suggested above, this “project” today is not 
an effort to return to an imagined Golden Age of Catholic legal 
education during which the education and formation of lawyers 
was pervasively informed and deliberately shaped by the Church’s 
philosophical and intellectual resources and accomplishments.  It 
is a new, creative effort.5  As Breen and Strang show, “the 
 
2 See Richard W. Garnett, Whom Should a Catholic University Honor?: “Speaking” 
with Integrity, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 233, 234 (2010) (“[T]he University of Notre 
Dame is an important, interesting, and inspiring Catholic institution . . . .”). 
3 John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal 
Education in the United States (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the St. John’s Law Review). 
4 Id. at 22; see also, e.g., id. at 465 (“[W]e conclude that a genuinely distinctive 
Catholic identity must have an intellectual foundation. It must have an ‘intellectual 
architecture’ that provides a rational structure and sense of direction to the 
academic enterprise.”). 
5 See generally, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Why Does the Church Have Law 
Schools?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (1995) (exploring the mission of Catholic law 
schools as “one way to be a priestly people”); Thomas M. Mengler, Why Should a 
Catholic Law School be Catholic?, 7 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 211 (2010) (discussing 
two principal reasons why Catholic law schools should be Catholic: “Indispensable 
Conviction” and Catholic moral formation as a “we”). 
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principal reason why Catholic colleges and universities created 
new law schools or acquired already existing ones was to provide 
the children of Catholic immigrants with the means of socio-
economic advancement by becoming lawyers and gaining entry 
into the professional classes of American society.”6  There were 
other reasons, too, and they are presented and discussed in the 
manuscript, but it seems clear that, with a few possible 
exceptions, “Catholic law schools in the United States were not 
founded with the goal of promoting a uniquely Catholic 
philosophy of law . . . or specifically Christian approach to legal 
education.”7  Instead, “the specific goal of articulating a Catholic 
philosophy of law was clearly subordinate to other more 
practical, demographic, and institutional goals . . . .”8 
Second, and relatedly, Breen and Strang document 
thoroughly their contention that, during the mid-to-late 
twentieth century, for a variety of reasons, Catholic law schools 
and their faculties came to a “new self-understanding of Catholic 
identity” and, as part of this process, whatever distinctive 
markers of Catholic character, mission, and ethos they might 
have possessed were—with some exceptions—muted, watered 
down, translated, or eliminated.9  As a result, today, “[o]ther than 
the modifier ‘Catholic,’ [Catholic law] schools do not share 
many—if any—distinguishing characteristics.  There is next to 
nothing about their faculty and faculty scholarship, their 
curricula and pedagogy, student bodies, culture, and aesthetics 
that set them apart from the mine-run of American law 
schools.”10  And as Breen and Strang explain, most of the 
practices, programs, slogans, and symbols that are sometimes 
identified as evidence of continued, meaningfully Catholic 
character do not, on examination, establish the case.11 
 
 
6 Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 468. 
7 Id. at 42. 
8 Id. at 43. 
9 Id. at 437 ff. 
10 Id. at 464. 
11 Id. at 462 ff.; see also, e.g., id. at 479 (“A purely ornamental, decorative 
Catholicism is inadequate because it does not differentiate what occurs in the 
classroom or in scholarship, and a rhetorical Catholic identity claiming a special 
emphasis on social justice manifest, for instance, in legal clinics, is inaccurate.”). 
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Third, A Light Unseen reminds any readers who needed 
reminding that “personnel is mission” and mission is a decision.12  
The failure of most law schools—particularly during their rapid 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s—to hire faculty with “a strong 
sense of mission” is identified, correctly, as contributing to the 
fact that, “[a]t the close of this era, . . . Catholic law schools 
[were] virtually indistinguishable from their secular 
counterparts . . . .”13  It is true as a general matter, of course, that 
the ability of a group, society, association, party, or institution to 
stand for something, to express something, to advocate for 
something, and to accomplish something depends crucially on the 
ability to identify, form, and manage their leaders and staff.14  
And this is true with a vengeance in the context of the project of 
building, enhancing, and preserving a Catholic law school’s 
distinctive character and mission.  That is, any distinctiveness 
with respect to character and mission depends on personnel—
administrators, staff, students, but especially faculty—who see 
that distinctiveness as something to be pursued, valued, and 
protected and not as an oddity to be hidden or an obstacle to be 
overcome. 
During my twenty years at Notre Dame Law School, this 
necessity has been appreciated and embraced by the faculty 
community, even as healthy differences and disagreements 
regarding the entailments and implications of our distinctive 
Catholic mission have been worked out and worked through.  But 
again: whatever the Catholic mission of a Catholic law school is, 
it will not be realized without a clear-eyed, intentional, and 
proactive focus on identifying, hiring, mentoring, forming, and 
retaining committed faculty—of all faiths and none. 
III. 
Having highlighted these preliminary, but essential, points, I 
want to focus on what was identified above as Breen and Strang’s 
core claim: a Catholic law school must have an “intellectual 
architecture” that sets it apart.  Recall, again, that—whatever 
else might have been, at various times, distinctive or unusual 
 
12 Id. at 450; see also, e.g., id. at 21 (noting the “vital importance of intentionally 
hiring faculty who know and embrace the school’s Catholic mission”). 
13 Id. at 219. 
14 Cf., e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572–73 
(2000). 
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about them—most Catholic law schools in the United States did 
not and do not have such a setting-apart “intellectual 
architecture.”  If only because of the discrimination practiced by 
other institutions, Catholic law schools had good numbers of 
Catholic students and faculty, but their aims and practices, and 
their understanding of the enterprise, were not innovative or 
distinctive in ways that are connected to their Catholic character.  
It is true that the schools aimed to facilitate access to the 
profession for people who for socioeconomic and other reasons 
were being kept out, and they later launched and developed 
programs (as all law schools did) that provided experiential and 
service opportunities to students and much-needed assistance to 
vulnerable clients who might otherwise be unable to afford it.  No 
doubt, access and service to the marginalized and needy are good 
things and would resonate with and appropriately reflect a 
Catholic law school’s mission.  Still, to paraphrase an observation 
once made by a former colleague of mine, America’s Catholic law 
schools were, and generally are, “public law schools in Catholic 
neighborhoods.”15 
Breen and Strang believe, though, that Catholic law schools 
can, and should, be different in ways that go beyond 
demographics and that they can, and should, possess and display 
such an “architecture”: “For the adjective—Catholic—to be 
meaningful, what it modifies—legal education—must be 
different.”16  They are referring, again, to a distinctiveness that 
involves more than providing clinics, teaching legal ethics, urging 
students to direct their talents and training to the needs of the 
vulnerable, and lifting up the importance of justice.  They 
contend, again, that if there is any value to distinctiveness, it 
must be rooted in, and reflect, an “intellectual architecture.”  
They consider, and reject, the possibility that either a natural-
law orientation or the body of post-nineteenth century “Catholic 
Social Thought” could do the trick.  Instead, and following 
Alasdair MacIntyre,17 they propose—and I agree—that the 
foundation and cornerstone of that architecture needs to be a  
 
 
15 Alfred J. Freddoso, Introduction to CHARLES E. RICE, WHAT HAPPENED TO 
NOTRE DAME?, at xii (2009).  
16 Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 493. 
17 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, GOD, PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITIES: A 
SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (2011).  
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distinctively Christian moral “anthropology,” that is, an account 
of what it means to be human, why it matters that we are, and 
what it means for our lives together.18   
In the interest of full disclosure, it should be conceded that 
the previous paragraph is an example of one author agreeing 
with other authors because the latter’s views so neatly reflect the 
former’s.  A short, self-promotional anecdote will not, I hope, be 
out of place: about seventeen years ago, I cofounded a “blog” 
called “Mirror of Justice.”  The blog proclaimed (and still 
proclaims) the goal of developing “Catholic legal theory.”  Its 
contributors have included several dozen, mostly Catholic, law 
professors from a range of institutions, some Catholic and others 
not.  In my very first post, “Law and ‘Moral Anthropology,’ ” I 
wrote the following: 
One of our shared goals for this blog is to . . . “discover[ ] 
how our Catholic perspective can inform our understanding of 
the law.”  One line of inquiry that, in my view, is particularly 
promising . . . involves working through the implications for 
legal questions of a Catholic “moral anthropology.”  By “moral 
anthropology,” I mean an account of what it is about the human 
person that does the work in moral arguments about what we 
ought or ought not to do and about how we ought or ought not to 
be treated; I mean, in Pope John Paul II’s words, the “moral 
truth about the human person.” 
The Psalmist asked, “Lord, what is man . . . that thou 
makest account of him?”  This is not only a prayer, but a 
starting point for jurisprudential reflection.  All moral problems 
are anthropological problems, because moral arguments are 
built, for the most part, on anthropological presuppositions.  
That is . . . , our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our 
“foundational assumptions about what it means to be human.”19 
In any event, the point of this recollection is to agree with 
Breen and Strang about the importance, and the centrality of, 
the question: How might this idea of a distinctively Catholic  
 
 
 
18 See, e.g., Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 464 (“We argue that the Catholic 
intellectual tradition, focused on a Catholic anthropology of the human person, is the 
likely best candidate to justify and order Catholic legal education.”). 
19 Richard W. Garnett, Law and Moral Anthropology, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Feb. 
6, 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Psalms 143:3 (Douay-Rheims American)), 
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/02/law_and_moral_a.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q5WE-ENG9]. 
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moral anthropology ground and sustain the distinctive, and 
distinctively Catholic, intellectual architecture of a present-day 
law school? 
To answer this question—or, at least, to gesture towards an 
answer—I want to borrow from some thoughts that I have been 
imposing on first-year law students for several years.  I begin 
these (what one student called) “dad talks” by suggesting that 
the study of law involves at least four levels, or layers.  (“Layers” 
is better, I think, because it suggests that, as with a sphere, the 
deeper one goes, from wherever on the surface one starts, the 
closer one gets to the center.)  I then take the students through a 
tour of these layers: 
[On] Layer One, [we encounter—again, and again, and 
again—]the bare words of legal texts (statutes, constitutions, 
judicial opinions, regulations, etc.).  At this level, the new law 
student encounters strange new terms like “replevin” and terms 
of art like “mens rea” that can play shibboleth-type functions at 
sports bars or provide proof-of-diligence to relatives at 
Thanksgiving.  Certainly, what happens on Layer One is 
important.  In law, [and not only to “textualists,”] words matter.  
Part of learning to be a lawyer is learning how to use them 
precisely, correctly, and [effectively]. 
Still, no legal education worthy of the name could stop 
here.  The study and practice of law involve more than just 
performing utterances and producing words called “law.”  The 
terms that make up legal questions and problems do not, 
generally speaking, assemble or select themselves.  One has to 
go deeper. 
As they reach Layer Two, then, law students study and 
learn about substantive legal doctrines (for example, the “Lemon 
test” and the “mailbox rule”), interpretive techniques, and canons 
of construction.  They engage tests, standards, elements, and 
forms.  They develop legal skills in research, writing, advocacy, 
counseling, and negotiation.  They are pushed, in ways that can 
be jarring and unsettling, to “think like a lawyer.”  That is, they 
become comfortable abstracting general principles from 
particular cases, drawing distinctions, and identifying analogies.  
They are challenged to read carefully, write clearly, and reason 
[expertly]. 
[S]ome (shallow) understandings of “what it means to 
study law and to be a lawyer” stop here, at Layer Two.  Here, 
some would say, we have the practical, the useful, the real.  All 
the rest—whatever might lie beyond (or beneath)—is just 
theory, policy, and the ivory-tower navel-gazing of the 
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frustrated or failed doctoral candidates who make up the law 
professoriate.  Sure, one might need to peek beyond Layer Two 
for material to sprinkle over one’s exam answers, but one 
shouldn’t expect to find anything of any use or relevance in the 
trenches, in the “real world.” 
This is entirely wrong[, however, and the] study and 
practice of law involve more than terms and techniques.  There 
is no reason to think that our coming robot overlords will not be 
able to function just fine at Layers One and Two.  We must dig 
deeper. 
[And so], at Layer Three, we roll up our sleeves and test, 
evaluate, and critique all the tools and terms we picked up at 
Levels One and Two.  This is where we can demonstrate, one 
hopes, a comparative advantage over the robots.  We ask, for 
example, whether legal doctrines, rules, tests, standards, and 
practices are consistent with the relevant history and whether 
or not it matters that they are.  We ask whether they operate 
efficiently and produce desirable effects and incentives, and 
whether they align with or contradict moral commitments. 
It turns out, interestingly, that when we pursue our study 
deeply enough to reach Layer Three, we start to see that many 
of the law’s apparently discrete and distinct subject areas raise, 
on examination, similar questions, and are “about,” in the end, 
the same things.  In fact, they may all be about the same thing, 
singular: “How can we—how ought we—order our lives together 
and best achieve our common good so that we can all flourish?” 
I am confident that, at most law schools[—public and 
private, religious and non-religious, Catholic and non-
Catholic—]students are challenged to spend some time on Layer 
Three[, just as they are challenged to participate in clinics, to 
observe the rules of ethics, to promote access to justice, and so 
on.  At] most law schools, it is at least proposed to students that 
they will not truly understand what’s going on at Layers One 
and Two unless they have a sense of what’s going on at Layer 
Three [and that what] happens below shapes what happens 
above.  Layers One and Two look like they do because of what is 
going on at Layer Three.  One can learn about legal doctrines, 
but one will not really understand them unless one appreciates 
the reasons why they are what they are. 
[Layer Four, though, is—with] apologies to Douglas 
Adams[—]the “meaning of life, the universe, and everything” 
[l]ayer.  Here, we ask not only about the “legislative intent” 
underlying a particular provision, but also about, for example, 
“who and what we are, what were we made for, and why it 
might matter.”  Layer Four is where we think about not only 
the most efficient default rules and the “cheapest cost avoiders,” 
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but also about the nature and destiny of the human person and 
the connection between our human nature and the legal 
enterprise.  St. Augustine famously wrote that “you have made 
us for yourself, O God, and our hearts are restless until they 
rest in thee.”  This is a fact about us.  We need to ask, “What 
differences does this fact make?”  What does it mean for the law, 
and for lawyering, that we have, as C.S. Lewis[—following 
Pascal, following Augustine, etc.—]suggested, a God-shaped 
hole [in us]?20 
Back to Breen and Strang.  As they observe, “law in the 
Catholic . . . tradition has a point”; it is an activity or enterprise 
with a purpose, that is, to advance the common good and thereby 
promote the authentic flourishing of human persons.21  To 
understand the “point” of the law, then, in order to understand 
what human flourishing and human community are, one has to 
wrestle with who and what persons are and are for, with moral 
anthropology.  The “intellectual architecture” that Breen and 
Strang identify as being an essential dimension of any account of 
a Catholic law school’s distinctiveness, then, must involve work 
at Layer Four. 
At least four aspects of or things about human persons 
matter and are crucial to seeing and understanding the “point” of 
law.  And a meaningfully Catholic law school should be willing to 
propose—indeed, should be enthusiastic about proposing—them 
to its students: persons—that is, we—are dependent, relational, 
rational, and loved.22  To say that we are dependent is to say that 
we are not Promethean and fully autonomous.  We exist in 
community and need others for our flourishing and formation.  
Similarly, we are relational.  Social-contract theories that 
imagine otherwise, and that try to build accounts of politics or 
legitimacy on stories about self-sufficient individuals wandering 
nervously through forests, fail to capture this truth of moral 
anthropology.  We are rational: we believe that we can get to the 
 
20 These few paragraphs are adapted from Richard W. Garnett, Some 
Thoughts for New Law Students, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Aug. 26, 2019) (first quoting 
DOUGLAS ADAMS, LIFE, THE UNIVERSE, AND EVERYTHING (1982); and then quoting 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(Yale Univ. Press 2008) (1970)), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/08/54611/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8FK-AQ4T]. See C.S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 133–35 
(HarperCollins 2014). 
21 Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 485. 
22 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY 
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (Open Court Publ’g Co. 2011) (1999). 
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truth.  It is possible for the human mind to find and grasp the 
right answer to the question posed.   
Each of these aspects is, to understate things considerably, 
worth discussing in far more detail than is possible here.  For 
present purposes, I want to dwell on “loved.”  Like the Christian 
philosopher, Nicholas Wolterstorff, I have to come to think that 
what makes human dignity a fact, and what makes it the case 
that we do have dignity, and rights, a fact that has important 
implications for how we may and ought to treat each other, is 
that we are loved by God.  It is not our capacities and abilities 
but our being-loved.  Indeed, Christians believe that we are 
loved—created and sustained, yes, but also loved—by a God who 
is Love.  That “God is love”23 is, Pope Emeritus Benedict proposed 
in his first encyclical letter, the key to the “heart of the Christian 
faith,” namely, “the Christian image of God and the resulting 
image of mankind and its destiny.”24  In other words, “ ‘God is 
love’ is not only the truth about God, it also carries and 
illuminates the truth about us.”25  This truth provides a strong 
account, not only of the what, but also of the why, of dignity, of 
rights, and of justice—of the point of law. 
Wolterstorff’s point echoes, I think, the beautiful children’s 
story, The Velveteen Rabbit.  In that story, a tattered, lost, 
abandoned toy rabbit becomes, eventually, “real,” by virtue of 
having been deeply and unconditionally loved by a little boy.  
And as another of my Notre Dame colleagues, Paul Weithman, 
has explained, for Wolterstorff, similarly, “[n]atural human 
rights . . . inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by that 
love” and “are what respect for that worth requires.”26  The fact of 
our being loved by a God who is Love is the key fact for any 
Catholic legal theory or distinctively Catholic law school’s 
mission, and understanding this fact is essential to seeing, and 
then realizing, the “point” of the law.27 
 
23 1 John 4:16 (New American). 
24 BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EST ¶ 1 (2005). 
25 Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV. 
281, 281 (2007). 
26 Richard W. Garnett, Righting Wrongs and Wronging Rights, FIRST THINGS 
(Oct. 2008) (quoting Paul Weithman), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/10/ 
003-righting-wrongs-and-wronging-rights [https://perma.cc/GC2B-PLVJ ]. 
27 For an intriguing example of asking what a particular legal practice, criminal 
punishment, would look like if we regarded love (agape) as the first virtue of social and 
legal institutions, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Law Like Love, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 18 
(2004). 
